Developing Apps as though Operations Matters

SecAppDev 2011

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Quiz

Here's the scenario

- -Your software has just suffered a major security breach
- The CEO has called in law enforcement and a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) to help clean up the mess

Now what?

What are the CSIRT's top priorities? How will your software help the CSIRT do its job? You did plan for this, right? –Microsoft's SDL spells out planning for crises

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Here's my answer to #1

Highest priority is to determine the business impact Second highest is situational awareness throughout the incident

Third is to recommend a course of action to take, and then to coordinate execution of that plan

In reality

In my 20+ years of incident response experience:

-The CSIRT is called up after the fact

• Or they find out about the incident by accident!

-Often, the attackers have come and gone

-CSIRT has to assemble the puzzle from available data

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• There's never enough-or the right-available data

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CSIRT needs to...

Determine the who, what, when, where, and how (WWWH)

-Using existing records of the events

- -Disk and network forensics often not terribly useful
 - After the fact may be too late
 - Time consuming and costly
 - Only used to find specific data
- -Where do we look?
 - Logs
 - Auditability vs. accountability

Event logging

In a production data processing environment, there can be many sources of log data

-With luck, they're sent to a central log concentrator

-Consider the per-source perspective

- What did the (router, firewall, web server, Java container, database) see?
- Now, what did they report?
- How do they speak to WWWWH?

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The trouble with logs

Most are simply extensions of debugging hooks in code

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-They are written for the *developer*, not the CSIRT

-Wrong audience and purpose

Let's take a look at a couple examples

Company background

Large ISP in Netherlands -Range of services: DSL, VoIP, hosting Massive enterprise application infrastructure -Much of it is exposed to the big bad internet Security is taken very seriously -Availability is primary concern -Fraud prevention is close second

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Examples -1

Does this mean anything (useful) to you?

Feb 11 09:09:30 server1 setuid-wrapper[76686]: zzz called "d/usr/bin/setuid/ atmping --monitor LINEIDNUMBER"

Feb 11 09:09:33 server1 setuid-wrapper[76727]: zzz called "d/usr/bin/setuid/ greplog --tail --appstream account=wibble1,"

Feb 11 09:09:34 server1 setuid-wrapper[76736]: zzz called "?^C/usr/bin/setuid/ zoeklog -i 1.2.4.4"

Feb 11 09:09:35 server1 greplog[76727]: zzz searches with TRACE for account=wibble1,

Examples -2 How about this one? Feb 6 10:28:08 service8 ServiceCentre-1.36.24[9231]: [STATS] {Service:217} servicecentre_login: username mangled=54894ef40dca18a5 Feb 6 10:28:27 service6 ServiceCentre-1.36.24[2919]: [STATS] {Service:217} servicecentre_login: username_mangled=bf2808e01aeb8deb Feb 6 10:28:35 service6 ServiceCentre-1.36.24[2923]: [STATS] {Service:217} servicecentre_login: username_mangled=8ec5c711d167964d Feb 6 10:29:27 service6 ServiceCentre-1.36.24[2934]: [STATS] {Service:217} servicecentre_login: username_mangled=2b82db4bbf54f7aa Feb 6 10:29:41 service8 ServiceCentre-1.36.24[9258]: [STATS] {Service:217} servicecentre_login: username mangled=64aa378b8f32905c Feb 6 10:29:55 service2 ServiceCentre-1.36.24[98842]: [STATS] {Service:217} servicecentre_login: username_mangled=aa9e261c1f797bc5 Feb 6 10:29:57 service8 ServiceCentre-1.36.24[9263]: [STATS] {Service:217} servicecentre_login: username mangled=54894ef40dca18a5 Copyright© 2011 KRvW Associates, LLC

Examples -3 And what does this one tell you? 64.4.8.137 - - [24/Jan/2007:06:15:09 -0500] "GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0" 200 0 "-" "msnbot/1.0 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm)" 64.4.8.137 - - [24/Jan/2007:06:15:09 -0500] "GET /rss.xml HTTP/1.0" 200 8613 "-" "msnbot/1.0 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm)' 64.4.8.137 - - [24/Jan/2007:06:38:41 -0500] "GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0" 200 0 "-" "msnbot/1.0 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm)' 64.4.8.137 - - [24/Jan/2007:06:38:41 -0500] "GET /about.php HTTP/1.0" 200 9770 "-" "msnbot/1.0 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm)' 64.4.8.137 - - [24/Jan/2007:06:42:21 -0500] "GET /index.php HTTP/1.0" 200 5080 "-" "msnbot/1.0 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm)' 64.4.8.137 - - [24/Jan/2007:06:42:38 -0500] "GET /courses.php HTTP/1.0" 200 7509 "-" "msnbot/1.0 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm)' 64.4.8.137 - - [24/Jan/2007:06:50:07 -0500] "GET /whats_new.php HTTP/1.0" 200 12404 "-" "msnbot/1.0 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm)' 64.4.8.137 - - [24/Jan/2007:10:09:30 -0500] "GET /contact.php HTTP/1.0" 200 3526 "-" "msnbot/1.0 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm)' 64.4.8.137 - - [24/Jan/2007:10:09:34 -0500] "GET /consulting.php HTTP/1.0" 200 4936 -" "msnbot/1.0 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm) 64.4.8.137 - - [24/Jan/2007:10:09:34 -0500] "GET /sclist.php HTTP/1.0" 200 3139 "-" "msnbot/1.0 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm)"

Wow, those were ugly

So, what is missing from our logging?

-Meaningful data about the software

-Pretty much all of WWWH

So let's see what can be done to improve things –Let's start by looking at some case studies

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Case study 1: ISP Provisioning

Web-based ISP provisioning application -Used to open/close/modify customer accounts

Logs used to look like this

1.2.4.4 - - [17/Jun/2009:12:00:30 +0200] oms "GET /ads1/? postcode=1234ZZ&housenumber=21&floor=&ds1_type=&abo=ADSLEntryPackage&PartnerID=w ibble HTTP/1.1" 302 5 "http://www/g/ads1/check.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; nl; rv:1.8.1.7) Gecko/20070914 Firefox/2.0.0.7 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)" TLSv1 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA

What can we learn here?

-See the problems?

-Finding fraudulent requests is not easy


And then the CSO stepped in to improve things

<section-header><text><text><text>

Provisioning, cont'd

Third attempt, showing improvements

Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_new order 942963 created with userid murfle klantid 1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_new order 942964 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 bns_ship order 942965 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_modem order 942964 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_modem order 942964 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_modem order 942964 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942966 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942966 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942966 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942966 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942967 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942967 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942967 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942967 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942967 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942967 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942967 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 942967 created with userid murfle klantid
1240655
Feb 11 19:14:06 oms : [audit][INFO] 1.195 xso_engineer order 94296




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Provisioning, cont'd

See how the end result has improved things? Security team can now find business-relevant data in the logs


-The logs are now written for the right audience

The log formats (syslog using log4j) are unchanged



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Case study: Servlet

We'll step through some code issues using a Java EE servlet

- -Code excerpts are meant for illustrative purposes only
- -Not meant to be compilable per se



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Scenario

You're the dev team leader for some enterprise code

-Boss has asked to add some functionality

New function

-Users can view their account settings


Assumptions


-Only authenticated users have access to the servlet


- Enforced by Java EE container in presentation layer
- -No input validation takes place on the client

Servlet excerpt: first attempt	
<pre>String Lastname = request.getParameter("LASTNAME");</pre>	
String Query = "SELECT Accounts FROM CUSTOMERS WHERE LASTNAME = '" + Lastname + "'";	
<pre>// Query will be: SELECT Accounts FROM CUSTOMERS WHERE LASTNAME = '_lastname_'</pre>	
<pre>Statement selectStatement = connection.createStatement (); ResultSet resultSet = selectStatement.executeQuery(Query);</pre>	
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Servlet excerpt: added SQLi







Servlet excerpt: tier 2ish				
/* OK, so let's consider what we log in more detail:				
Who We need to log the caller here. That should come from somewhere outside the direct control of the user. We'll grab that from the Session object. Also src/dst IP and other packet-layer detail.				
What What did the attacker do? Known attack vs. unknown. Raw data or quarantine of malicious data?				
When basic time/date stamp.				
Where See src/dst data above. */				
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Servlet excerpt: tier 3 stuff

/*	Possibilities,	in ascending order, include (in addition to Tier two steps above):
		Turn up logging of offending user
		Kill session and force reauthentication
		Quarantine the attack data
		Null out any PII in the account
		Kill/disable the account
		Store attack in "evidence bag" with
		tamper-evident seal
		Put attacker in a "walled garden" where he can
		do no harm (but thinks he can). */

<section-header><text><text><list-item><list-item><list-item>

Candidates

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Primitives to consider building

- -Quarantine data (with evidentiary support)
- -Common input validation attack recognition
- -Evasive actions

Legacy apps

How do you improve the auditability of your legacy apps?

- -Application firewalls can help to a degree
 - Most are exclusively for web apps
- -Must have intimate knowledge of how the app works in order to be useful

-Event logging is a trivial and natural add-on this way


Getting started

Don't wait for "them" to come to you

- -Seek out the CSIRT at earliest stage of the dev process
 - Coordinate features, logging, etc.
 - Inventory of what gets logged is vital
 - Interface with IDS data/team to ensure compatibility with app logging data
- -Seek out General Counsel or privacy officer
 - Ensure logging is in compliance
 - May need to be different by region

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